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This paper examines a simultaneous determination of corporate control mechanisms, and
its effects on firm performance. The corporate control mechanisms considered include the
following; insider shareholding, institutional shareholding, the board of directors, dividend
policy, and capital structure. This paper applies a simultaneous equation methodology and
investigates the interdependence among the corporate control mechanisms. In the first part,
the paper finds that firm-level variations of control mechanisms are large across time
although average variations are relatively small. These variations are related to one another,
which is confirmed by Granger causality test based on dynamic panel autoregression model.
More specifically insider shareholding, institutional shareholding and outside director ratio
cause each other. With regard to interdependence among the control mechanisms, 2SLS(two
stage least squares) regression results show that insider shareholding and institutional
shareholding are substitutes while institutional shareholding acts as complements to the ratio
of outside members in the board of directors. Then in the second part, the paper examines
the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance. Firm performance,
measured by Tobin’s Q, has a positive association with leverage ratio while that has a
negative relation to outside director ratio. This suggests that there may be a room for
reforming corporate governance in Korea. Specifically it is necessary to enhance the
independence of the outside directors.
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표 상장회사 사외이사 현황< 1>



















1.45 , 2004 1.49 , 2005 1.42 ( , “
,” 2004).
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
701 693 684 669 676 668 655
4,850 4,601 4,336 4,108 4,133 4,103 4,055
6.92 6.64 6.34 6.14 6.11 6.14 6.19
1,204 1,418 1,421 1,356 1,399 1,437 1,454
1.72 2.05 2.08 2.03 2.07 2.15 2.22
24.8 30.8 32.8 33.0 33.8 35.0 35.9

















7) , “ ,” 2003.
8) Shivdasani and Yermack(1999)
.
9) , “ ,” 2003.
10) (2001) ‘ ’ ‘ ’
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표 안건별 기관투자자 의결권 행사 공시 현황 년< 2> (2003 )


















292 2 4 3 5 95.4
81 1 1 - 2 95.3
328 2 1 1 5 97.3
254 - 4 3 4 95.8
283 - 15 3 5 92.5
60 - 1 - 3 93.8
( , ) 3 5 - - 1 33.3
1,301 10 26 19 25 94.8

































표 주요 변수의 요약통계량< 3>
( : %)
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14) Kole and Lehn(1999) .
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표 기업통제장치의 연도별 분포< 4>
( : %)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
IN 1% 24.77 20.45 23.35 26.73 26.57 26.73
1%<IN 10% 16.68 17.71 16.91 15.14 17.39 16.26
10%<IN 20% 20.48 20.61 20.45 20.29 19.32 21.74
20%<IN 30% 15.39 15.78 16.10 15.62 15.46 14.01
30%<IN 40% 12.17 12.56 11.76 12.40 11.76 12.40
40%<IN 10.50 12.88 11.43 9.82 9.50 8.86
100 100 100 100 100 100
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
BOD 20% 68.21 88.08 69.57 69.40 58.13 55.88
20%<BOD 30% 19.74 8.53 18.68 19.00 26.41 26.09
30%<BOD 40% 7.54 2.42 8.21 7.09 8.86 11.11
40%<BOD 4.51 0.97 3.54 4.51 6.60 6.92
100 100 100 100 100 100
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
INST 1% 41.87 35.27 47.02 54.59 34.14 38.33
1%<INST 5% 21.03 22.38 20.61 23.35 19.65 19.16
5%<INST 10% 14.20 16.75 11.92 9.82 16.91 15.62
10%<INST 20% 13.01 15.14 11.59 6.60 15.78 15.94
20%<INST 9.89 10.47 8.86 5.64 13.53 10.95
100 100 100 100 100 100
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
DEBT 20% 5.35 2.09 3.70 5.64 6.44 8.86
20%<DEBT 40% 22.03 16.75 19.16 24.96 24.32 24.96
40%<DEBT 60% 35.59 40.10 37.20 32.37 35.27 33.01
60%<DEBT 80% 26.09 26.57 26.09 26.09 26.25 25.44
80%<DEBT 10.95 14.49 13.85 10.95 7.73 7.73
100 100 100 100 100 100
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
DIV 0.1% 40.13 37.04 40.42 43.64 40.26 39.29
0.1%<DIV 0.2% 2.09 2.74 2.09 2.74 1.93 0.97
0.2%<DIV 0.3% 3.25 2.74 3.22 3.22 2.90 4.19
0.3%<DIV 0.4% 3.51 3.86 4.03 2.58 3.54 3.54
0.4%<DIV 51.01 53.62 50.24 47.83 51.37 52.01
100 100 100 100 100 100
: .
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표 기업통제장치의 변화< 5>
( : %)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
IN 1% 0.112 1.583 2.464 2.536 3.060
1%<IN 10% 5.499 8.193 6.927 7.411 7.648
10%<IN 20% 14.828 14.489 14.476 14.647 14.536
20%<IN 30% 23.797 22.470 20.386 19.586 19.616
30%<IN 40% 34.843 31.878 29.881 29.808 29.106
50%<IN 54.679 43.290 40.881 39.102 36.962
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
BOD 20% 3.847 13.566 15.979 20.831 22.662
20%<BOD 30% 28.169 25.122 20.345 26.430 27.384
30%<BOD 40% 37.931 36.536 26.349 27.222 42.333
40%<BOD 48.773 44.921 47.778 42.163 44.508
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
INST 1% 0.239 2.392 2.709 5.102 5.427
1%<INST 5% 2.796 3.975 3.449 7.895 6.003
5%<INST 10% 7.120 5.562 2.933 6.700 7.502
10%<INST 20% 14.657 10.072 5.940 11.574 9.361
20%<INST 37.403 25.746 14.472 20.311 16.071
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
DEBT 20% 14.475 18.719 16.210 17.968 19.572
20%<DEBT 40% 32.088 32.412 30.641 32.016 33.037
40%<DEBT 60% 50.359 49.433 48.625 50.267 46.162
60%<DEBT 80% 68.372 67.166 65.566 62.517 60.418
80%<DEBT 116.083 109.652 89.601 70.132 61.693
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
DIV 0.1% 0.0004 0.126 0.130 0.250 0.400
0.1%<DIV 0.2% 0.156 0.237 0.268 0.207 0.185
0.2%<DIV 0.3% 0.264 0.257 0.268 0.269 0.288
0.3%<DIV 0.4% 0.355 0.272 0.286 0.478 0.686
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표 기업통제장치의 연간 변화의 분포< 6>
( : %)
0~10% 10~20% 20~30% 30~40% >40%
IN -5% 11.59 2.75 11.38 17.65 14.95 32.84
-5%< IN -1% 10.99 7.25 14.37 14.07 13.62 11.44
-1%< IN 1% 58.98 72.16 52.30 45.57 55.48 42.07
1%< IN 5% 10.19 7.45 14.37 13.04 10.30 8.49
5%< IN 8.25 10.39 7.58 7.67 5.65 5.17
100 100 100 100 100 100
0~1% 1~5% 5~10% 10~20% >20%
INST -5% 15.54 0 0 27.03 47.21 62.34
-5%< INST -1% 15.70 0 38.76 28.49 18.36 12.13
-1%< INST 1% 42.15 73.73 27.90 18.31 10.16 8.79
1%< INST 5% 11.51 11.86 13.86 12.79 9.18 5.86
5%< INST 15.10 14.41 19.48 13.37 15.08 10.88
100 100 100 100 100 100
0~20% 20~40% 40~60% 60~80% >80%
DEBT -20% 5.88 0 1.13 1.78 3.37 34.93
-20%< DEBT -10% 7.49 0 5.67 7.89 7.36 12.67
-10%< DEBT 10% 77.54 86.49 85.26 82.44 80.98 37.33
10%< DEBT 20% 4.75 8.11 4.35 5.11 4.45 3.77
20%< DEBT 4.35 5.41 3.59 2.78 3.83 11.30
100 100 100 100 100 100
0~0.1% 0.1~0.2% 0.2~0.3% 0.3~0.4% >0.4%
DIV -0.1% 22.62 0 16.95 16.00 31.03 40.68
-0.1%< DIV -0.05% 4.51 0.10 1.69 12.00 8.05 7.45
-0.05%< DIV 0.05% 44.52 85.43 35.59 41.33 27.59 13.80
0.05%< DIV 0.1% 4.23 0.10 11.86 9.33 8.05 6.58
0.1%< DIV 24.11 14.37 33.90 21.33 25.29 31.48
100 100 100 100 100 100
0~20% 20~30% 30~40% >40%
BOD -10% 8.01 2.60 15.74 30.30 32.99
-10%< BOD -5% 3.66 0.73 12.64 9.09 6.19
-5%< BOD 5% 61.84 64.71 59.87 46.67 44.33
5%< BOD 10% 5.35 4.12 7.54 7.88 13.40
10%< BOD 21.14 27.84 4.21 6.06 3.09
100 100 100 100 100
18
표 통제장치 변화의 상관계수< 8>
LN INST BOD LEV DIV
LN 1
INST -0.0157 1
BOD 0.0084 0.0117 1
LEV -0.0048 -0.0763*** -0.0175 1
DIV 0.0425** 0.0622** 0.0078 -0.2027*** 1
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.
.
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen(1988)




     
 
    
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      ≤  
(2)
(2)










    

   

      (1-1)
( : (individual effect) ,  )
. Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen(1988)
.
16) (1) (identification)  ≥    . (1)
(1-1) (recover) ≥   
.
20














































: 1) , 2 ( )
.
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21) Chen and Steiner(1999), Jensen et al.(1992), Moyer et al.(1992), Singh and Davidson(2003), Agrawal and
Knoeber(1996) .
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2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
: ( ) , *, ** *** 10%, 5% 1%
.



























22) < 9> . ,
.
23) .
24) Black, Jang, and Kim(2006b), Black et
al.(2005) .














(fixed effect panel model)
, < 10>
< 11> . < 10>
, < 11>
.





















28) ( ) Morck et al.(1988),
McConnell and Servaes(1990, 1995) and Kole(1995) .
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표 기업가치와 통제장치의 관계< 10> (I)
: Q









































































































3,105 3,105 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
N 621 621 621 621 621 621
T 5 5 4 4 4 4
R-square 0.1050 0.1050 0.1190 0.0945 0.2911 0.2975
: ( ) , *, ** *** 10%, 5% 1%
.
30
표 기업가치와 통제장치의 관계< 11> (II)
: Q




































































































































































3,105 3,105 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
N(T) 621(5) 621(5) 621(4) 621(4) 621(4) 621(4)
R-square 0.0198 0.0198 0.0243 0.0230 0.0485 0.0468
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621 621 621 621 621
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
: ( ) , *, ** *** 10%, 5% 1%
.
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621 621 621 621 621
p-value 0.0000 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
: ( ) , *, ** *** 10%, 5% 1%
.
42




















































































기업지배구조의 상호관계 및 기업성과에 관한 연구 43
부표 의 계속< 3>








































621 621 621 621 621
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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621 621 621 621 621
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
: ( ) , *, ** *** 10%, 5% 1%
.
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부표 기업가치와 통제장치의 관계< 5> (III)
: Q



























































































































3,105 3,105 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
N(T) 621(5) 621(5) 621(4) 621(4) 621(4) 621(4)
R-square 0.1081 0.1081 0.1188 0.0944 0.2958 0.3020
: ( ) , *, ** *** 10%, 5% 1%
.
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부표 기업가치와 통제장치의 관계< 6> (IV)
: Q





















































































































































































3,105 3,105 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484
N(T) 621(5) 621(5) 621(4) 621(4) 621(4) 621(4)
R-square 0.0198 0.0198 0.0243 0.0230 0.0481 0.0465
: ( ) , *, ** *** 10%, 5% 1%
.
